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A funny thing happened on the way to the White House in 1988.
In keeping with powerful electoral trends over the last two gen-
erations, a large number of swing voters split their tickets in various
ways-most prominently by voting for a Republican in the presiden-
tial contest and for Democrats in congressional races.' Various polls
also suggested that many Americans preferred the Republican nomi-
nee for President, but the Democratic nominee for Vice President.2
Yet, in sharp contrast to general electoral rules permitting ticket split-
ting in other contexts, voters were not allowed to split their tickets by
voting for a Republican President and a Democratic Vice President.
The funny thing is that Dan Quayle now stands a proverbial heartbeat
away from the Oval Office, despite a real possibility that a majority of
the 1988 electorate, if given a clear choice, would not have put him
there.
Is there a reason for allowing voters to split their tickets in many
other ways, but not between President and Vice President? Does the
Constitution compel this result? Are there sound historical or policy
reasons to support it? Does economic analysis, game theory, or social
choice theory explain the seeming anomaly? Or is it, instead, simply a
* Professor, Yale Law School.
** Acting Professor of Law Designate, University of California, Davis School of Law.
A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988.
We are grateful to Ian Ayres, Jonathan Knee, Vinita Parkash, and Peter Swire for their
comments on an earlier draft. We also benefited from the suggestions of the faculties of the
UC-Davis and UCLA schools of law, where a version of this paper was presented.
We dedicate this Essay to our parents, as evidence that we can indeed work together (if we
try).
I Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government 1 (1992) (discussing ticket splitting in the 1988
elections). Fiorina explains that those most likely to split their tickets between the two parties
are moderates. Id. at 77 & n.22.
2 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
Virginia Law Review
constitutional accident-President J. Danforth Quayle-waiting to
happen? Maybe things aren't so funny after all.
Part I of this Essay sets the stage for analysis by identifying recent
developments and patterns that make the issue of executive ticket
splitting both meaningful and timely. In Part II, we discuss possible
sources for the rule against ticket splitting in presidential elections
and conclude that the prohibition is rooted in state law and practice,
rather than federal statutory or constitutional law. Part III looks to
theory, policy, and history to identify and question possible justifica-
tions for the rule. Our analysis indicates that the prohibition is far
more difficult to justify than one might assume. Finally, Part IV
posits some advantages of permitting voters to split their federal exec-
utive tickets.
Before we begin our analysis, however, let us make one thing clear:
we intend no personal disrespect to Vice President Quayle. Indeed,
we take no position on whether Quayle deserves more credit from the
American public than he has received.3 We simply mean to focus
analytic attention on a troubling feature of the current scheme of
presidential selection: a person who-fairly or unfairly-may not
enjoy and may never have enjoyed the support of a majority of the
American electorate has nevertheless been placed only a heartbeat
away from the presidency.4
I. THE CURRENT ELECTORAL LANDSCAPE
Three features of contemporary election law and practice set the
stage for our inquiry. First, current law provides voters with a broad
range of options to split their tickets. Voters may, for example, vote
for federal executive candidates of one party and federal legislative
candidates of another. Citizens likewise are free to cross party lines in
electing federal legislators-say by voting for a Republican for the
U.S. Senate and a Democrat for the U.S. House of Representatives.
3 See, e.g., Bob Woodward & David S. Broder, Quayle's Reputation vs. the Record:
Damaging Campaign Coverage was Sometimes Inaccurate, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1992, at Al
(one article in a seven-part series focusing upon Quayle and the fairness of public skepticism
concerning his competence).
4 Thus, a Quayle presidency can be termed a "constitutional accident" waiting to happen in
much the same way that a Dukakis presidency in 1989 would have been a "constitutional
accident," had Dukakis managed to win the electoral college despite losing the popular vote in
1988. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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Moreover, no obstacle exists to voting for federal officials of one party
and state officials of another. Indeed, the only noteworthy instance of
vote tying outside the presidential context exists at the state executive
level-between the offices of governor and lieutenant governor-and
even there it exists in only some states.-
A second key feature of the current electoral landscape is the dra-
matic increase in ticket splitting generally by American voters over
the last fifty years. In the twelve presidential elections between 1900
and 1944, on average, voters in only 11% of the congressional dis-
tricts voted for a President of one party and a Representative of
another.6 For the period of 1946 through 1988, that number
increased, on average, to 3 1.5%. 7 In 1984, almost half of all congres-
sional districts supported House and presidential candidates from dif-
ferent parties.8 Indeed, the dominant pattern over the last quarter of
a century has been a Republican President and a Democratic Con-
gress. This trend represents a major departure from the electoral pat-
terns of American voters before World War II, when a "divided"
government in Washington, D.C. was unusual. What was once an
exception now appears to be the norm. Moreover, the numbers sug-
gest that this shift in presidential/congressional voting patterns
reflects a larger ticket-splitting trend. From 1952 to 1980, for
instance, ticket splitting between House and Senate seats rose from
9% to 31% nationally.9 In 1948, approximately 66% of voters inter-
viewed indicated that they had voted a straight party line for all
5 A number of states constitutionally bind the election of their top executive officials. See
Fla. Const. art. 4, § 5; Haw. Const. art. 5, § 2; Ill. Const. art. 5, § 4; Ind. Const. art. 5, § 4;
Iowa Const. art. 4, § 3; Kan. Const. art. 1, § 1; Md. Const. art. II, § 1B; Mass. Const. amend.
art. LXXXVI; Mich. Const. art. 5, § 21; Minn. Const. art. V, § 1; Mont. Const. art. VI, § 2(2);
N.M. Const. art. V, § 1; N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 1; N.D. Const. art. V, § 4; Ohio Const. art. III,
§ la; Pa. Const. art. 4, § 4; S.D. Const. art. IV, § 2; Utah Const. art. VII, § 2; Wis. Const. art.
5, § 3. Several states bind the elections of governor and lieutenant governor through statute.
See Alaska Stat. § 15.15.030(5) (1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-204 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 9-181 (1958).
6 Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann & Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress,
1989-1990, at 53 (1990); Mark A. Zupan, An Economic Explanation for the Existence and
Nature of Political Ticket Splitting, 34 J.L. & Econ. 343, 344-45 (1991).
7 Ornstein, et al., supra note 6, at 53; Zupan, supra note 6, at 344-45.
8 Zupan, supra note 6, at 344-45.
9 Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1980, at 20-21
(1984). See also Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as
Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1990) (relying on
Wattenberg's data).
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offices on a ballot; by 1972, that figure had dropped to less than
40%. 10 Ticket splitting in state and local elections also has increased
appreciably.1" In 1988, three quarters of the American population
lived in states with "divided" governments, and the absolute number
of states with such governments hit an all-time high. 12 In short, as
one commentator put it, "[t]icket-splitting has assumed massive pro-
portions compared to the rate just two decades ago, and only a small
minority of the electorate now believes that one should vote strictly
on the basis of party labels." 3
Political scientists have put forth many explanations for this gen-
eral increase in ticket splitting, although most accounts focus on the
recent pattern of a Democratic legislature and Republican executive.
Some explanations rely on the relatively liberal fiscal platform of the
Democratic party and the relatively conservative fiscal platform of the
Republican party. Other explanations stress the roles of incumbency
and gerrymandering. Still others turn on the importance of television
in modern elections and the inability of the major parties to police
themselves. 4 As we shall discuss in Part III, one's view about the
wisdom of prohibiting ticket splitting in the federal executive may
well depend upon one's precise explanation for the observed increases
in ticket splitting.
The third and perhaps most dramatic development bearing on the
federal executive ticket-splitting question was George Bush's selection
of then-Senator Dan Quayle to be his vice-presidential running mate
in 1988. It is no secret that many-perhaps most-American voters
that year harbored serious reservations about Quayle's ability to serve
competently as President in the event that Bush could not complete
his term. Many polls suggested that the public's confidence in Quayle
was significantly lower than its confidence in his Democratic oppo-
nent, Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Less than a month before the 1988 gen-
eral election, three fourths of those polled thought that Bentsen was
10 James Q. Wilson, American Government: Institutions and Policies 189 (1980).
11 Wattenberg, supra note 9, at 19-21 (noting that between 1952 and 1980 "[t]he proportion
of voters splitting their tickets in elections for [various] state and local offices has gone from 27
to 59 percent").
12 Fiorina, supra note 1, at 26.
13 Wattenberg, supra note 9, at 23.
14 See Fiorina, supra note 1, at 14-25, 64-82 (discussing gerrymandering, incumbency, and




"qualified" to take over the presidency; only two fifths thought Sena-
tor Quayle was.1 5
The public's uneasiness has not measurably subsided in the inter-
vening three and a half years. A poll taken in April 1991, a week
before President Bush was hospitalized for cardiac examination, dis-
closed that 67% of those voters questioned thought Quayle unquali-
fied for the presidency; only 19% thought he was qualified.1 6 Bush's
hospitalization only increased the anxiety in the press and among the
public. As one commentator put it, "[t]he mere contemplation of
invoking the [Constitution's] disability clause temporarily transferring
presidential power to the Vice President sent shivers through the
American body politic. ' 17 Even more recently, a poll published in the
Los Angeles Times on December 2, 1991 reported that only 35% of
those voters queried found Vice President Quayle to be "qualified" for
the presidency. 18 A number of press reports in the aftermath of Presi-
dent Bush's collapse in Japan in January of 1992 corroborate these
numbers.' 9 Whether the public's appraisal is justified, "perhaps never
before has the vice president been held in such universally low esteem
as is Dan Quayle."20 And with another presidential election almost
upon us, history threatens to repeat itself. Once again, Dan Quayle
may be elected Vice President in the teeth of possible strong voter
preference for his Democratic counterpart (whoever that might be).
15 George Skelton, The Times Poll, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1988, at Al. See also George
Skelton, Democrats Face Uphill Lap, L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1988, at Al (citing nationwide
survey findings that registered voters, by four to one, considered Bentsen to be "more
qualified" to ascend to the presidency if necessary than Quayle and that even among Bush
supporters Bentsen was favored by five to three). Similarly, a poll of one thousand viewers
taken shortly after the debate between vice-presidential candidates Quayle and Bentsen
revealed that 80% of those polled found Bentsen's performance to have been superior. Jules
Witcover, Crapshoot: Rolling the Dice on the Vice Presidency 352 (1992). Interestingly
enough, 80% of those polled also suggested that Quayle's poor performance would not
influence their vote between the two main party tickets. Id.
16 Time/CNN Poll: Public's Confidence Slipping, But GOP Strong, The American Political
Network, Inc., Apr. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
17 Witcover, supra note 15, at 5.
18 James Gerstenzang & David Lauter, Quayle Set on Getting Last Laugh, L.A. Times,
Dec. 2, 1991, at Al, A18.
19 See, e.g., David Nyhan, For Bush: An Election-year Picture He'd Rather Erase, Boston
Globe, Jan. 9, 1992, at 17 (citing poll figures that 51% of voters believe Quayle is not qualified
for the presidency); Bob Woodward & David S. Broder, Waiting in the Wings for 1996, Wash.
Post, Jan. 12, 1992, at A19 (stating that 50% of voters polled thought Quayle was not qualified
to serve as President should something happen to Bush).
20 Witcover, supra note 15, at 5.
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All of this strongly suggests that a Bush/Bentsen option would
have been attractive to voters in 1988, had they been free to split their
executive tickets. It also suggests that many voters might welcome a
ticket-splitting option in the upcoming presidential election. The
questions then become, how and why does the law preclude this
option?
II. THE SOURCE OF THE PROHIBITION
A. The Constitution of the United States
The logical starting point in the search for the source of the prohi-
bition on federal executive ticket splitting is the federal Constitution,
which sets forth relevant election procedures in Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment. Article II, in its original form, provided:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sen-
ators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress ....
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Bal-
lot for two Persons .... The Person having the greatest Number of
Votes shall be the President,... and if there be more than one who...
have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives
shall immediately chuse [sic] by Ballot one of them for President ....
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
[next] greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice
President 21
The Twelfth Amendment changed this election scheme shortly before
the election of 1804, by providing that:
The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot
for President and Vice-President... [T]hey shall name in their ballots
the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person
voted for as Vice-President .... The person having the greatest number
of votes for President, shall be the President .... The person having
the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent .... 
22
21 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3 (amended 1804) (emphasis added).
22 U.S. Const. amend XII (emphasis added).
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As originally drafted, the Constitution thus envisioned an electoral
"college"23 at which representatives selected by each state would elect
federal executive officials by submitting ballots that named two sepa-
rate persons, but did not specify an office for each person. The names
were then counted, the leading vote-getter was proclaimed Presi-
dent,24 and the second leading vote-getter was proclaimed Vice Presi-
dent. The Twelfth Amendment altered this procedure by requiring
the electors from the states to vote separately for the President and
Vice President. In other words, after 1804, the electors were to desig-
nate in their ballots one person as President and one person as Vice
President.
Before analyzing these provisions in detail, we should note, of
course, that the Constitution speaks only in terms of "Electors"
selected by the states, and not of ordinary citizens voting in elections.
Initially, states did not hold general elections for the presidency. By
the 1820s, however, general presidential elections were commonplace
in the several states. 25 And over time, many states enacted laws pur-
porting to legally bind their electoral collegians to vote for the candi-
dates selected by the state voters in the general election.26 This set of
practices is a basic feature of today's "unwritten" constitution, and
appears to have the approval of both the country and the Supreme
Court.27
With this current custom-an informal constitutional amendment
of sorts-in mind, let us analyze the relevant constitutional provi-
sions. As a textual matter, neither Article II nor the Twelfth Amend-
ment obliges persons to vote for a President and a Vice President of
the same party. Indeed, the Twelfth Amendment's decoupling of the
selection of the President and Vice President, at least at first blush,
seems more consistent with a regime in which those who cast bal-
lots-electoral collegians and, ultimately, the citizen voters who today
de facto stand behind them-are free to select the two candidates
23 Though it is common today to speak of the electoral "college," the Constitution, strictly
speaking, does not use this word.
24 This assumes that the leading vote-getter was listed as one of two names on the ballots of
a majority of collegians. If not, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives.
25 James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 103 n.22 (1979).
26 See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 25105 (West 1989) (requiring electors to vote for candidates
of the political party that they represent).




independently.2 8 Nor do the circumstances surrounding the adoption
of the Twelfth Amendment dictate a contrary result. In fact, the con-
cerns underlying the amendment of Article II had little to do with the
potential for a "split'? executive.
As explained above, the original Constitution did not permit elec-
tors to specify their votes for the two executive offices. This did not
mean that the electoral collegians, and the states and people whom
they represented, did not care which of the two persons they voted for
would become President. To the contrary, leaders of the two political
factions (parties) that emerged shortly after the Constitution went
into effect-the Federalists and the Republicans-often had strong
views as to who should serve as President and who was better suited
to the role of Vice President. But collegians who wished to elect a
President and Vice President of the same party faced a problem under
the original Constitution: if all of the party's collegians named the
same two individuals and if the party constituted a majority at the
electoral college, then a tie would result between the two leading vote-
getters. Under the terms of Article II, the election would then be
thrown to the always-unpredictable House of Representatives for res-
olution, where the party risked "inversion" of the two candidates. In
other words, there was a good possibility that the House would ele-
vate an individual who was intended to be the Vice President to the
presidency. 29 This problem was exacerbated by the lack of a guaran-
tee that the party dominating the electoral college would also com-
28 The Constitution does, of course, impose some restrictions on voting by electoral
collegians. Both the President and Vice President must satisfy certain requirements set out in
Article II, and the Twelfth Amendment provides that the electoral collegians from each state
cannot vote for a President and Vice President who are both inhabitants of that state. Thus, if
George Bush and Lloyd Bentsen were both "inhabitants" of Texas under the Twelfth
Amendment, an issue raising intricate questions beyond the scope of this Essay, the
Constitution would have prevented Texas' electoral collegians from voting for a Bush/
Bentsen executive. See U.S. Const. amend XII.
29 As early as 1788, Alexander Hamilton noted the inversion problem created by Article II
in discussing the possible election of John Adams as George Washington's Vice President:
If it should be thought expedient to endeavour to unite in a particular character [i.e.,
Adams for Vice President], there is a danger of a different kind to which we must not be
inattentive-the possibility of rendering it doubtful who is appointed President. You
know the constitution has not provided the means of distinguishing in certain cases & it
would be disagreeable even to have a man treading close upon the heels of the person we
wish as President [i.e., Washington].
See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (Nov. 23, 1788), in 11 The Papers of
James Madison 365, 366 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds. 1977).
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mand a majority in the House. Indeed, many politicians appeared to
expect, justifiably, that the opposite often would be true.
To guard against the possibility of inversion, early party leaders
developed the technique of sloughing votes off the party's vice-presi-
dential choice.3 0 Party leaders would caucus throughout the country
and convince collegians from certain states to delete the party's pre-
ferred vice-presidential candidate from the two-person ballots cast at
the electoral college, naming instead someone who was not the party's
choice. This technique would avoid a tie between the majority party's
two choices, but it also enabled the minority party to elect its presi-
dential candidate to the vice-presidency. That is, by sloughing off
"vice-presidential" votes, the majority party created a window of
opportunity for the minority party's most popular candidate to finish
second in voting and thus capture the office of Vice President.
This is precisely what happened in the election of 1796. To avoid a
possible tie vote and subsequent inversion of the candidates, various
New England-based Federalist collegians intentionally diverted votes
from the party's vice-presidential choice, Thomas Pinckney, to ensure
that the party's presidential choice, John Adams, would finish alone
at the top (which he did, with seventy-one electoral votes). As a
result, the Republican presidential candidate, Thomas Jefferson, was
able to finish in second place (with sixty-eight votes) and thus secure
the office of Vice President. Pinckney finished third (with fifty-nine
votes).31
Significantly, the outcome of the 1796 election did not stir up any
real movement to amend the selection method set forth in Article II.
To be sure, the specter of inversion caused some leaders to question
the wisdom of the original "double-balloting" system.32 Jefferson, in
fact, apparently drafted an amendment to require electoral collegians
to designate their votes for President and Vice President as early as
1797. 33 This proposal never got out of the House of Representa-
tives.34 Similar efforts were made in 1798 and again in early 1800,
30 See Lolabel House, Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 20-40
(1901) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
31 Id.; Witcover, supra note 15, at 19.
32 See Witcover, supra note 15, at 23.
33 House, supra note 30, at 39.
34 Witeover, supra note 15, at 23.
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"but they aroused little interest and the subject was dropped."35 The
major reason no reform efforts resulted from the 1796 election is that
Jefferson and others did not see the original selection method's bias in
favor of a split executive as a major drawback.36 Jefferson himself
believed that the Vice President would act only as a legislative and not
as an executive agent 7.3  Moreover, some who would later unsuccess-
fully oppose the Twelfth Amendment saw a great deal of virtue in
having an intrabranch check within the executive. As Representative
James Hillhouse of Connecticut would later urge, the President and
Vice President should be of different parties "to check and preserve in
temper the over-heated zeal of party.... If we cannot destroy party,
we ought to place every check upon it."' 38 Thus, the fact that the
election of 1796 resulted in a split executive was not enough to trigger
a serious move to amend the Constitution. Real interest would be
stirred only after the election of 1800, which more starkly raised the
inversion problem and the inadequacy of the "sloughing" system that
had evolved to address it.
In 1800, for a variety of reasons that need not be delved into here,
the Republican party's collegians failed to slough votes off Aaron
Burr, their choice for Vice President. The result was a first-place tie
between Burr and the Republican presidential candidate, Jefferson.
The tie threw the election into the Federalist-controlled House of
Representatives, where Federalist leaders threatened to elevate Burr
to the presidency to spite Jefferson. After much wrangling and many
ballots, the House ultimately selected Jefferson as President. But the
real possibility of having Burr and Jefferson inverted soured Republi-
cans (and many Federalists) on the selection system of Article II.
Proposed in the aftermath of the Jefferson/Burr debacle, the Twelfth
Amendment was ratified in time to avoid any possibility of a similar
occurrence in the election of 1804.39
It is worth reiterating that the inversion problem, and not the ten-
dency of the election scheme under Article II toward a split executive,
was the primary motivating force behind the adoption of the Twelfth
35 House, supra note 30, at 39.
36 Id. (citing draft amendments prepared by Jefferson).
37 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 22, 1797), in 7 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 108 (Paul L. Ford ed. 1896).
38 House, supra note 30, at 50 (quoting Hillhouse's speech).
39 Id. at 50-51; Witeover, supra note 15, at 25.
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Amendment. As Gouverneur Morris from New York wrote in a let-
ter in 1802, the primary "evil... in the present mode of selection" is
the possibility that "at some time or other a person admirably fitted
for the office of President might have an equal vote with one totally
unqualified, and that, by the predominance of faction in the House of
Representatives, the latter might be preferred."'  Indeed, as noted
above, some political leaders, most forcefully Connecticut Represen-
tative Hillhouse, considered the split-executive tendency of Article II
as originally drafted to be its main virtue. These leaders saw the loss
of this tendency as a cost to be borne in order to remedy the inversion
problem, rather than a benefit to be obtained as a result of the new
amendment.
None of this is to say, however, that the framers of the Twelfth
Amendment did not recognize that it would enable one party more
easily to capture both the presidency and the vice-presidency. Clearly
they did.41 But recognizing the inevitable and being happy about it
are entirely different things. Moreover, the framers of the Twelfth
Amendment never suggested that the new electoral system precluded
individual electors (or states, for that matter) from preferring a Presi-
dent of one party and a Vice President of another. That is, even those
who disliked the original system's bias toward a split executive never
voiced an intent to replace it with an absolute bias in the other
direction.42
In the end, then, the Twelfth Amendment makes the Constitution
safe for strong parties and a "unitary" 43 federal executive, but in no
way requires them. Although the Amendment was designed to enable
40 Witcover, supra note 15, at 24 (quoting an 1802 letter from Gouverneur Morris to the
President of the New York Senate).
41 House, supra note 30, at 50.
42 In fact, the results of the second election after the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment
show that collegians were not bound to tie their votes for President and Vice President. In the
1808 election, James Madison received 122 electoral votes, but his party's choice for Vice
President, George Clinton, received only 113. See Witcover, supra note 15, at 28.
43 We use the term "unitary" executive to refer only to a White House in which the
President and Vice President are of the same party. The term has a different meaning in cases
and literature addressing the extent to which separation of powers principles give the President
countermand or removal power over individuals and agencies who are located in the executive
branch or who are exercising executive power-an issue beyond the scope of our remarks here.
For an excellent analysis of that issue, see Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992).
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electors to more easily opt for a party ticket, it does not compel them
to do so. By modifying the rules of Article II, the Twelfth Amend-
ment eased the electoral triumph of a party's executive ticket if that
was what a majority of electors wanted. When viewed in this light, the
Amendment's ultimate message seems to be increased electoral
choice, rather than a mandate of executive "unity." 44
The constitutional custom of holding general elections for the presi-
dency does not change this conclusion. Under any reading of the
Constitution, states are certainly free to provide information-in the
form of voter preferences-to their collegians. And nothing in the
text or history of the Twelfth Amendment prevents a state from
allowing its citizens to register their preferences for a split executive
ticket. Many states, of course, go further and attempt to bind their
collegians to the results of the general election,45 but the constitution-
ality of this practice in no way depends on whether that election
allows ticket splitting. In short, neither the words nor the spirit of the
Twelfth Amendment mandates a "unitary" executive.
B. Federal Statutes
Another possible source for the prohibition on executive ticket
splitting, federal statutory law, also fails to embody the prohibition.
Instead, the most relevant statutory provisions provide only that each
state shall choose electors, who in turn "shall meet and give their
votes" at certain times and places and "shall vote for President and
Vice President, respectively, in the manner directed by the Constitu-
tion." These sections by their terms say nothing about ticket split-
ting and appear merely to incorporate the electoral college provisions
of the Constitution, which, as we have seen, do not answer the ticket-
splitting question.
44 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952) (observing that after the Twelfth
Amendment, collegians "could vote the regular party ticket without throwing the election into
the House. Electors could be chosen to vote for the party candidates for both offices, and the
electors could carry out the desires of the people, without confronting the obstacles which
confounded the elections of 1796 and 1800" (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). See also
House, supra note 30, at 43, 47 (noting that the Amendment's framers sought to vindicate
majoritarian popular will in selection of the federal executive); id. at 51 (noting that the
possibility of a split executive under the Amendment is raised whenever an election is thrown
into Congress).
45 See supra note 26.
46 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7, 8 (1988).
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Indeed, there is serious question whether Congress could compre-
hensively regulate the way in which electoral collegians are chosen or
cast their votes. In Ray v. Blair, the Supreme Court apparently recog-
nized the power of states to bind their collegians to vote a certain
way,47 notwithstanding what Justice Jackson described as an original
understanding that collegians "would be free agents, to exercise an
independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified
for the Nation's highest offices." '48 In doing so, however, the Court
used language suggesting that states alone, and not federal lawmakers,
have the power to regulate the behavior of collegians, subject to con-
stitutional constraints such as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments:
The presidential electors exercise a federal function in balloting for
President and Vice President but they are not federal officers or
agents any more than the state elector who votes for congressmen.
They act by authority of the state that in turn receives its authority
[to select electors] from the Federal Constitution.49
C. State Law
In the end, then, the real source of the prohibition on executive
ticket splitting must be the laws in each of the fifty states-more spe-
cifically, those laws governing the structure of ballots."0 Generally
speaking, general election ballots ask voters to choose electoral col-
legians pledged to the listed party tickets. Although the names of the
47 In Ray v. Blair, the Court upheld Alabama's requirement that each person seeking to
have his or her name placed on the Democratic party primary ballot as a candidate for
presidential elector sign a pledge prior to the primary election. Under the pledge, candidates
agreed to support the candidates for President and Vice President ultimately selected by the
Democratic National Convention. Although the opinion's logic strongly supports a state's
authority to require such a pledge before allowing an individual to run for presidential elector
in a state's general election, the majority explicitly noted that the question of a would-be
elector's right to a space on the general election ballot was not before the Court. 343 U.S. at
223 n.10.
48 Id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 224-25 (citations omitted).
50 Election codes in some states provide for vote tying between the offices of President and
Vice President on the general election ballot. See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 10213 (West 1977);
W.Va. Code § 3-6-2(d)(1) (1991). Other states do not explicitly codify vote tying in their
election codes. Apparently, the decision to tie presidential and vice-presidential votes in these
states is made by the executive agencies charged with designing the ballot. See collection of




collegians are sometimes printed on the ballot, more often they are
not."1 Ordinarily, the executive ticket that garners a plurality of votes
then captures the state's electoral college votes, and the winning
party's collegians vote for the party's candidates (assuming the candi-
dates are living when the vote is taken). 2
The ballots of some states, by allowing voters to "write in" candi-
dates, present a minor wrinkle. This write-in option might be thought
to give voters complete freedom to split their votes between executive
candidates of different parties if they so desire. Such is not the case,
however, for two reasons. First, in at least some states, the election
codes and the instructions on the ballots do not allow voters to write
in candidates who already appear on the ballot under one of the rec-
ognized parties.53 Thus, a voter could register a preference for an
executive split between obscure parties and individuals, but could not
have voted for a Bush/Bentsen ticket in 1988. Second, and more
fundamentally, election ballots' use of party tickets itself profoundly
changes how votes are counted and voter preferences aggregated.
Imagine, for example, a vote distribution as follows: 34% for Bush/
Quayle (Ticket A), 33% for Dukakis/Bentsen (Ticket B), and 33%
for Bush/Bentsen (write-in Ticket C). In such a situation, the Bush/
Quayle Republican ticket (A) would capture the state's electoral
votes, even though 66% of the electorate (B and C) might have
favored Bentsen over Quayle. In this example, the ballot's use of
"tickets" itself results in a kind of undercounting of write-in votes for
split tickets. (It also leads to the curious result that a 1% shift from
Bush/Quayle to Dukakis/Bentsen would spell victory for Dukakis
even though two-thirds of the voters might have preferred Bush.)
If, instead, we counted the above ballots by "untying" the ticket,
Bush would win the presidential contest (67% to 33%) and Bentsen,
51 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. at 229 (observing that in 1951, nearly half of the states did not
print the names of candidates for electors on their general election ballots). See also sample
ballots from Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) (evidencing the practice of not printing names of candidates for electors
on the ballot in the 1988 presidential election).
52 See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 25105 (West 1989).
53 See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 10228 (West 1989) (providing sample ballot and instructions).
54 Requiring voters to "write in" certain options also raises the relative cost of these options
vis-i-vis other options that can be voted for with less effort. At the margins, this increased cost
appears to affect voter behavior. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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the vice-presidential race (66% to 34%). Of course, counting votes
for President and Vice President separately, by untying the ticket, can
create oddities of its own-in this example, by electing a divided exec-
utive even though 67% of voters (A and B) seemed to cast their bal-
lots for a unitary one." We shall return to these oddities later. For
present purposes, we simply note that the current method of counting
"ticket votes," and not "vice-presidency votes," often renders write-in
votes ineffective as ticket-splitting devices. Where the write-in ticket
comes in second or third in the balloting, the split-ticket compromise
will not prevail, even when a majority of voters prefers a split
executive.
Identifying how states prohibit executive ticket splitting is the easy
task; figuring out why is much more difficult. To that enterprise we
now turn.
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
A. Law and Economics Rationales
L Prisoners' Dilemmas
Many state electoral mechanisms and decisions can be explained
using concepts that are systematically studied under the "law and
economics" rubric. The "prisoners' dilemma," in particular, may be
a useful paradigm for understanding a number of state policies con-
cerning federal elections. One good example is the fact that each of
the fifty states-with an occasional, historical exception 56-- has given
all of its electoral college votes to the winning ticket, rather than split-
ting the electoral votes between the various tickets in proportion to
the popular vote. This winner-take-all approach to the electoral col-
lege appears eminently reasonable if we take as a premise each state's
desire to maximize its own importance in the presidential election
process. By providing each presidential candidate a large return (in
55 Current ballot forms do not tell us whether the 67% really prefer any unitary ticket to a
split ticket. To answer this question, we would need to allow voters to register their second
choices-that is, their preferences in the event their first choices do not prevail. As we explain
later, a ballot that provides such information can be easily devised. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
56 Maryland and New York departed from the norm in 1828, as did New Jersey in 1860 and
Michigan in 1892. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 186, 310. Maine may also be a departure
from the norm. Id. See generally Congressional Quarterly Inc., Elections 88, at 74-75 (Jane
Gilligan ed. 1988) (discussing historical departures from the norm).
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the form of the state's entire electoral college vote) for the candidate's
promises and platform planks targeted to the state's electorate, the
state increases the likelihood that all candidates will take the state
seriously and address its needs and concerns.
Assume, for example, that the swing (i.e., median) legislators in a
state faithfully represent the swing voters in the state electorate. By
embracing winner-take-all rules, state legislators maximize the clout
of the state's median voters in the presidential election. The dilemma,
of course, is that such winner-take-all rules make it much more likely
that a presidential candidate could win a majority of the nation's pop-
ular votes, yet lose in the electoral college. This result would actually
prevent the Chief Executive of the United States from representing the
nation's median voters.57
Even if virtually all voters in all states thought such an outcome
undesirable-a true democratic nightmare-no state might be willing
to make a unilateral shift from winner-take-all to proportionality. To
begin with, unilateral action by a single state might not reduce the
probability of the nightmare materializing. More importantly, every
state would have an incentive to encourage other states to shift to pro-
portionality and yet retain winner-take-all itself, thus maximizing its
clout. In equilibrium, each state would simply say to the others,
"After you," and no state would take the proportionality bait. With-
out an enforceable proportionality rule binding all states-be it a
federal statute (if constitutional") or a federal constitutional amend-
ment-each state has a strong incentive to defect from the optimal
collective arrangement by embracing winner-take-all.
The prisoners' dilemma also helps to at least partially explain the
hesitancy with which many states have moved in enacting term-limi-
tation legislation with respect to federal legislators. Although term-
57 Even a proportional approach does not guarantee that the candidate garnering a majority
of the popular vote will also win in the electoral college, for at least four reasons. First, the
electoral college is skewed in favor of less populous states, because the number of electoral
college votes given to a state depends on its number of representatives and senators. Less-
populous states have disproportionate power because representation in the Senate is equal for
all states. See U.S. Const. art II. Second, rounding errors exist both in the proportional
allocation of electoral votes and in the apportionment of House of Representatives districts.
Third, House districts are based upon population numbers rather than numbers of eligible
voters in a region. And fourth, voter participation rates vary considerably across states,
enhancing the relative voices of those who do vote in states having low voter turnouts.
58 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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limitation laws have been proposed and considered in many states,
very few have been enacted. One reason is that a state limiting the
terms of its federal officials will be disadvantaged in the competition
for federal pork barrel as against other states unbound by similar limi-
tations. Federal legislators from states with term limitations will, on
average, have less experience and seniority and, presumably, less clout
in obtaining local benefits in the form of grants, contracts, public
works, and so on. Even if a strong majority in each state (and, thus,
the nation as a whole) agreed that term limitation is a good idea, we
could expect each state to reject term limitations. Indeed, the
dilemma is even sharper: voters in any given state might rationally
prefer challengers to an incumbent year after year, but nevertheless
vote for the incumbent simply to gain, rather than lose, competitive
seniority and local pork.
There is an obvious constitutional irony in the fact that congres-
sional term limitations, if desired, are likely to be adopted only via a
constitutional amendment binding all states. At present, the Consti-
tution provides for term limitations only in the Twenty-Second ("Two
Term") Amendment, which applies only to the presidency.5 9 Yet the
presidential context does not present a prisoners' dilemma problem
comparable to that found in the congressional context; an individual
state, if it so desires, could choose to cultivate a reputation for being
anti-incumbent--or at least not antichallenger-in presidential con-
tests without necessarily diminishing its slice of the federal pork pie.
Indeed, to shift metaphors, a slightly squeaky state with anti-incum-
bent leanings might get more grease from the incumbent, first-term
President. Thus, from the perspective of the prisoners' dilemma
model, the Constitution seems to have gotten things backward: consti-
tutional term limitations might make more sense for members of Con-
gress than for the President.'
There does not appear to be a strong prisoners' dilemma explana-
tion for each state's decision to prohibit executive ticket splitting in
59 The Twenty-Second Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be
elected to the office of the President more than twice .... " U.S. Const. amend XXII.
60 There are, of course, other strong reasons, not rooted in the prisoners' dilemma model,
for the term limitation embodied in the Twenty-Second Amendment. On the general subject
of term limitation, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on
Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97 (1991); James C. Otteson, A
Constitutional Analysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation
Under the Constitution, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (1991).
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federal elections. If a state attempted to bind a voter to vote for a
Senator and a Representative of the same party, perhaps a prisoners'
dilemma story could be told-a state might think it would maximize
the amount of pork barrel it receives if all of its officials in Washing-
ton are on the same team and pulling in the same direction. But the
binding of votes within the federal executive does not appear to have a
similar basis. That is, even if a President tries to reward those states
that voted for him, each state would have little, if anything, to gain by
casting its electoral votes for a Vice President of the same party as the
President. A Vice President's access to a President of the same party
does, it could be argued, give the Vice President marginal power to
help reward states that voted for a winning unitary ticket, but this
power does not seem great. For that reason, any state could experi-
ment by permitting ticket splitting (and casting its electoral college
votes for a split ticket) without fear of any real disadvantage as
against other states, even in the event a unitary executive is elected.
2. Spatial Differentiation, Cycling, and Agenda Manipulation
Models
Another set of models that might be thought to explain the prohibi-
tion on executive ticket splitting builds on the work of the twentieth-
century political scientist Morris Fiorina and the eighteenth-century
mathematician, the Marquis de Condorcet. Let us begin by making
several simplifying assumptions to ease exposition. Assume that the
political spectrum can be mapped onto a simple line segment, with
one end point representing the extreme left and the other, the extreme
right. Assume further that only two parties exist, that each party's
candidates all hew to that party's platform, and that the platform sig-
nals to voters both the party's preferred position on the political spec-
trum and the party's ranking of other, less preferred positions. Under
these assumptions, we could imagine a stable two-party system where










Spectrum of Possible Political Outcomes
Figure One
In this simple diagram, the most preferred position of each party's
platform is represented by the "peak" (the mode) of its curve, and its
attitude toward other positions is shown by the shape of the curve.
To simplify further, suppose that eligible voters' most preferred out-
comes are arrayed continuously and equally across the political spec-
trum and that each voter casts her vote for the party whose "peak" is
closest to her own most preferred outcome.
At first, it might seem that each party has a strong incentive to
modify its platform and "move to the middle" to capture the median
voter and thus, the election. This incentive structure would render
the diagram in Figure One unstable. Yet, even casual empiricism
indicates that the real-life Republican and Democratic parties, though
obviously trying to appeal to middle-of-the-roaders, do not always
converge in the center. In essence, each party must protect its flank.
If the two parties met in the center-Tweedledum and Tweedledee-
then voters on both the left and the right wings of the spectrum might
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lose interest and not vote at all.61 And these voters are especially
important, given that: (1) they are more likely to vote in a party pri-
mary and thus influence who will bear the party standard and what
her platform will be, 62 and (2) they may be more likely to contribute
time and money than the middle-of-the-roaders, some of whom may
simply care less about politics.6 3 The crude mapping of Figure One
thus does represent a stable but delicate balance in a two-party world:
each party must move close enough to make credible appeals to the
swing voters in the center-but not so close to its competitor that it
loses its hard core of more ideologically extreme party members.64
Under these conditions, we begin to see why some voters might
want to split their tickets. As Professor Fiorina has pointed out, the
swing voters in many elections will often be middle-of-the-roaders
whose preferred position lies somewhere between the party platforms'
"peaks. ' 6  These voters might want to split their tickets-by voting
for a Republican in the race for Office X and a Democrat for Office
Y-in the hope that the ultimate mix of resulting policies will repre-
sent a compromise between the party platforms' "peaks," thus
approximating the swing voters' most preferred position.
This explanation works for intra-executive as well as executive-leg-
islative ticket splitting. If Office X is the presidency, Office Y can be
understood as either Congress or the vice-presidency. It might at first
61 See Fiorina, supra note 1, at 123 & n.28. See also Jeane Kirkpatrick, The New
Presidential Elite: Men and Women in National Politics 274-79 (1976) (noting that while each
party had a "distinctive ideological flavor, none was so ideologically distinctive and
homogeneous that it lacked any overlap with competing political groups").
62 See, e.g., William Crotty & John S. Jackson III, Presidential Primaries and Nominations
92-95 (1985) (finding, based on an analysis of voter turnout in the 1980 primaries, that those
voters at the extreme ends of the ideological continuum were most likely to vote in party
primaries).
63 See, e.g., id. at 116-37 (setting forth findings that those at the more extreme ends of the
ideological spectrum were more likely to be "political elites" and to serve as delegates to the
parties' national conventions); Kirkpatrick, supra note 61, at 277-78 (demonstrating that
"elites" tend to be more ideologically extreme than the parties' "rank and fie").
64 Our basic model in Figure One builds on the classic work of the political economist
Anthony Downs. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 114-41 (1957).
Downs, in turn, borrowed from earlier work by economists Harold Hotelling and Arthur
Smithies. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J. 41 (1929), reprinted in,
American Economic Association, Readings in Price Theory 467 (George J. Stigler & Kenneth
E. Boulding eds. 1952); Arthur Smithies, Optimum Location in Spatial Competition, 49 J. Pol.
Econ. 423 (1941).
65 Fiorina, supra note 1, at 77.
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be thought that, unlike a Democratic Congress, a Democratic Vice
President would be unable to force a Republican President to deviate
from the Republican platform, because, unlike Congress, the Vice
President lacks formal power to block presidential policies. How,
then, could sophisticated swing voters think that an intra-executive
ticket split will result in a compromise policy between the "peaks"?
To begin with, even informal checks may affect presidential policy.
The election of a forceful Democratic Vice President with her own
electoral mandate from the American people may send a message to a
Republican President about the scope of his own mandate. In addi-
tion, the very presence of such a Democrat in the executive branch, as
a watchdog and monitor, may curb possible presidential partisanship.
Further, the Vice President does have one awesome formal role-to
replace the President in case of death, resignation, or incapacity.
Sophisticated voters realize that they are voting for the probable set of
presidential policies over the next four years, and that the presidential
candidate's platform must be discounted by the possibility that he will
not complete his term. Given this, the expected value of a split execu-
tive is indeed between the "peaks" and, thus, different from the
expected value of a straight party ticket.
Thus far, the spatial differentiation story reflected in Figure One
helps to explain why ticket splitting may be attractive to certain vot-
ers, but cannot explain why interbranch ticket splitting should be
treated differently from intrabranch ticket splitting. However, the
story is not complete. Various cycling and agenda manipulation mod-
els, which explain some of the weaknesses and simplifications of "The
World According to Figure One," may tend to call ticket splitting
into question. But, as we shall see, these models likewise fail to show
why executive ticket splitting should be treated differently from inter-
branch ticket splitting, and thus cannot justify the different rules for
ticket splitting reflected in current law.
One obvious simplification of Figure One is its conception of the
political spectrum as a line segment-with the extreme left and
extreme right graphed as polar opposites. Many commentators have
noted that extremists from both wings-certain types of libertarians,
perhaps-often have more in common with each other than with
moderates. Perhaps the spectrum is better modeled as a circle than as
a line segment-a model that, as Professor Saul Levmore and Eliza-
beth Cook illustrated in a related context, powerfully changes strate-
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gic dynamics.6 In the line-segment model reflected in Figure One, a
system of majority rule in which outcomes are determined by median
voters is stable. 67 Yet as Condorcet demonstrated centuries ago,
under certain configurations of voter preferences, majority rule could
lead to instability or "cycling." Even if each vote is by majority rule,
rather than plurality rule, no stable majority outcome may emerge:
the majority (or more precisely, successive majorities) may prefer
inconsistent things.
Assume, for example, that voters must choose among three policy
options on a particular issue, and have the following set of
preferences:
TABLE ONE
Voter group I Voter group 2 Voter group 3
First choice A B C
Second choice B C A
Third choice C A B
In this world, if no voting group constitutes a majority of the electo-
rate and outcomes are voted on in pairwise competition (to guarantee
a majority outcome in each vote), which outcome will win? In
pairwise votes, successive majorities will prefer outcome A to out-
come B (with voter groups one and three in the majority); B to C
(with voter groups one and two in the majority); and C to A (with
voter groups two and three in the majority). The ultimate outcome of
the election seems to depend on manipulation of the agenda. For
example, even if voter group three constitutes only 2% of the electo-
rate and the remaining groups each represent 49%, group three can
achieve its preferred outcome (C), if A and B are voted on first, with
the winner of this first heat (A) then paired against C.
A similar dynamic can occur in the ticket-splitting context. In Fig-
ure One, each of the two parties has a single-peaked platform. But
suppose instead that the Democrats' preferences are double-humped,
indicating that Democrats favor the modal Republican position over
many compromises. That is, suppose Democrats' first choice is, of
66 See Saul X. Levmore and Elizabeth E. Cook, Super Strategies for Puzzles and Games 27-
37 (1981).
67 This stability is a reflection of the fact that preferences are "single-peaked" along the
continuum. See Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections 14-25 (1958).
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course, the pure Democratic program (their "peak"), but that their
second choice (a "foothill") is the pure Republican program, rather
than any compromise in the middle. Suppose further that the Repub-
licans' platform is symmetrical. Why might Republicans and Demo-
crats have such "foothills"? Perhaps because each thinks that certain
kinds of compromises are Solomonic baby-splittings leaving everyone
worse off; that the "divided" government at the heart of such com-
promises leads to deadlock, finger-pointing, and the diffusion of gov-
ernmental responsibility and accountability; or that if We cannot win
a clean sweep of all offices, We prefer that They win a clean sweep, so
that when things go wrong (as, of course, We believe they will), We
can return to the American electorate with a triumphant "We told
you so," and the electorate will have no one but Them to blame.
Under these circumstances, ticket splitting can enable the preferred
outcome of a small group-say 2%-to prevail over the strong prefer-
ences of a large majority. Consider the following set of electoral pref-














If ticket splitting is allowed in this situation, a majority (comprised of
voter groups two and three) will elect a Republican to Office X, and a
different majority (comprised of voter groups one and three) will elect
a Democrat to Office Y. The end result, however, is a split outcome
(Republican/Democrat) that the overwhelming majority of voters-
98%-considers the worst of all! This result occurs because two dif-
ferent issues are intertwined. Along one dimension-call it the tradi-
tional liberal/conservative dimension-ticket splitters are indeed the
"swing" group between Democrats and Republicans. But along
another dimension-that of "unitary officeholding"-ticket splitters
are not between Republicans and Democrats, but eccentric outliers.
If, indeed, the real world looks more like Table Two than Figure





done by structuring the agenda in the following way. First, the elec-
torate, in effect, votes (directly or indirectly through its legislature) on
whether ticket splitting between Offices X and Y should ever be
allowed. For this vote, Democrats and Republicans join together and
overwhelmingly approve the ban on ticket splitting (98% to 2%).
Once this ban is approved, Republicans and Democrats shift from
allies to adversaries, each trying to woo the seemingly indifferent
ticket splitters of voter group three.
But again, it is hard to see why intrabranch ticket splitting should
be banned if interbranch ticket splitting is allowed. If Office X in
Table Two is the presidency, Office Y can once again be seen as either
Congress or the vice-presidency. Indeed, the double-humped pattern
reflected in Table Two seems far more comprehensible in the inter-
branch context. As we have seen, one plausible rationale for this con-
figuration focuses on concerns about deadlock and diffusion of
responsibility-concerns that loom larger in the interbranch context
than in the intrabranch interaction between the President and Vice
President.68
Moreover, policymakers cannot really know whether the electo-
rate's preferences will always resemble Table Two more than Figure
One. Therefore, instead of enacting a permanent ban on federal exec-
utive ticket splitting, legislatures should allow voters to vote for Presi-
dent and cast conditional votes for Vice President. In 1988, for











If Dukakis is elected President:
- Quayle
- Bentsen
68 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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With this system in place, strong Democrats who believe in unitary
government (members of voter group one) would, for example, have
been able to vote for Dukakis for President, yet for Quayle as Vice
President in the event Bush was elected.69 If the actual pattern of
preference were indeed akin to that in Table Two, a split ticket would
not have been elected.
In the end, then, these models fail to explain the central anomaly:7"
why do we allow ticket splitting in virtually every electoral contest,
but not between President and Vice President?
B. Political Theory and Policy Justifications
Not all state electoral decisions can be best explained or modeled by
simple law and economics tools. The structure of primary elections in
presidential campaigns, for example, reflects a public policy concern
over the legitimacy of the officials who are ultimately elected; prima-
ries narrow the field and thus ensure that the ultimate winners have a
large enough percentage of the popular vote so as to have a tenable
claim to electoral legitimacy. We now turn to examine some policy
69 We are aware that adding complexity to the ballot can increase "transaction costs" of
voting and change overall voting behavior, see infra note 85 and accompanying text. Yet our
proposed ballot does not seem overly complicated-at least in a two-party world-and would
usefully focus every voter's attention on the real choice to be made: if my first-choice
presidential candidate loses, would I still prefer my first-choice vice-presidential candidate?
For a similar proposed use of conditional ballots in the corporate takeover context, see Lucian
A. Bebhuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1695, 1747-52 (1985).
If a conditional ballot were deemed too confusing, a roughly similar result could be obtained
by simply holding the election for Vice President twenty-four hours after the presidential
election results are tabulated.
70 In discussing this "anomaly," we do not mean to suggest that all prohibitions on ticket
splitting are equally feasible. Vote tying between the legislative and executive branches may
raise constitutional issues not present when a state ties votes for President and Vice President.
Interbranch conditional ballots also raise other complexities. It is not clear, for example,
whether voters should vote for a President and then cast conditional votes for congressional
representatives depending upon who wins the presidency, or vice versa. As a practical matter,
this is not a real issue in the executive election context, where the President clearly comes first.
And if the presidential election is conditioned upon the congressional election, should the
presidential election in a state be based on that state's congressional outcome or on the nation's
congressional outcome?
Although the constitutional and practical complexity of conditional ballots in the
interbranch context might be thought to justify the "anomaly," most of these complexities
(other than the ordering of offices) would not arise under our suggested "twenty-four hour
waiting period," see supra note 69.
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concerns that might animate the prohibition on ticket splitting within
the federal executive. In assessing the adequacy of these possible jus-
tifications, bear in mind that the justifications must do more than sug-
gest that a wise voter should toe the party line; rather, they must be so
compelling as to justify removal of the choice from individual voters
altogether. Ideally they also should distinguish the federal executive
from the interbranch context (where ticket splitting is almost always
permitted) and the state executive context (where some states allow
voters to split their votes between parties71).
The strongest policy considerations relate to the consistency of the
federal executive. In this context, consistency objections take two
forms: internal and temporal. Internal consistency arguments counsel
against a divided executive out of concern over the damage potentially
done by a Vice President acting as a loose cannon-challenging,
undermining, and contradicting the President's efforts to set policy.
This concern distinguishes the federal executive context from that of
the states, to some extent, because a loose cannon would be most dan-
gerous in the foreign affairs domain, where state executives play no
significant part and where the President often does speak in the voice
of the nation.72
This internal consistency concern, although plausible, does not
seem to justify the prohibition on ticket splitting. To begin with, loose
cannons have existed under the current system.73 Indeed, the current
system may affirmatively tend to create loose cannons: a party might
encourage its presidential candidate to pick as a running mate some-
one whose geographical ties and political leanings are somewhat dif-
ferent from (and thus in tension with) his own in order to "balance
the ticket" and attract support from as broad an electoral base as pos-
sible. Moreover, the threat of a Vice President acting as a loose can-
71 See supra note 5.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936)
(noting that in the international field, the President is the "sole organ" of the federal
government). By invoking Curtiss-Wright, we do not necessarily endorse the entire opinion or
all that it has come to represent.
73 Aaron Burr is, ironically, a good example. As one commentator put it, President
"Jefferson ignored Burr on all matters of state and even in questions of patronage involving
Burr's home state of New York. As presiding officer of the Senate, Burr made clear he was not
Jefferson's agent, breaking one tie vote against an administration bill." Witcover, supra note
15, at 22. Burr is by no means the only example. Both Franklin Roosevelt's first and second
Vice Presidents, John Garner and Henry Wallace, were often at odds with the policies of the
President they purported to serve. Id. at 69-83.
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non in a split executive is not as great as some would imagine. Unlike
state lieutenant governors, in whom state constitutions often vest real
authority, the Vice President has little inherent authority and is, in
reality, only as powerful as the President chooses to make him. The
only constitutional function assigned to the Vice President is to pre-
side over the Senate-a function that is, as the soon-to-be-Vice Presi-
dent Thomas Jefferson pointed out in January of 1797, more
legislative than executive. 74 Thus, there are substantial legal con-
straints on a would-be loose cannon. There also are significant polit-
ical constraints, at least on Vice Presidents who have further political
aspirations.
Concerns about temporal consistency focus on the problems that
arise when a President dies or leaves office during his term. Temporal
consistency arguments stress the importance of continuity within a
four-year administration, especially as it relates to foreign affairs and
the way other nations perceive the United States. Like the concern
over internal consistency, however, temporal consistency does not
appear to justify the peculiar cluster of current rules about vote tying.
First, a serious concern for temporal consistency is in tension with
many features of our Constitution, including the four-year presiden-
tial term and the Twenty-Second Amendment, which limits Presi-
dents to two terms. Recognizing temporal consistency as a major
goal of our electoral system would also seem to require amendment of
the statutes governing the succession of the President, so that succes-
sion would depend upon party affiliation.7 Few have seriously advo-
cated such a total overhaul of the current system. Second, as noted
above, the current system-with its tendency toward "balanced" tick-
ets-creates a significant danger of temporal inconsistency. This
proposition, too, has historical support.7 6
A more general response, which applies to internal as well as tem-
poral consistency, is that political consistency is just one important
74 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
75 Currently, for example, the Speaker of the House-in the last quarter of a century,
typically a member of the opposing party-stands after the Vice President in the line of
succession, only two heartbeats away. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1988).
76 There was little continuity when Vice Presidents John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and
Theodore Roosevelt replaced Presidents who died in office. See Bruce A. Ackerman, We the
People 84 (1991); Witover, supra note 15, at 35-37, 42-45. See also Ackerman, supra, at 333
n.7 (stating that "this kind of ideological instability is a systematic consequence" of the current
system of vice-presidential selection).
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factor among many to be weighed against experience and competence
when citizens cast their votes. The important factors being weighed
by the citizenry may well be changing, with the result being more
general ticket splitting. Many commentators agree that the rise of
television and the public's increased focus on individual personality,
rather than party platforms, partially explain the increased incidence
of ticket splitting. 77 If a key issue today is whether the people have
confidence in a particular candidate (rather than her party), then an
ability to instill such confidence would be a major qualification of the
Vice President. In the event Bush died, became ill, or resigned, would
the nation want Quayle rather than Bentsen speaking in its name?
The polls suggest perhaps not, even though Bentsen's message might
differ more substantially from that of Bush and, thus, raise consis-
tency concerns.
Of course, if policymakers think consistency is an important con-
sideration often overlooked by voters, paternalistically binding voters
may make some sense. But if voters are not focusing on consistency,
they are also probably failing to focus enough on the more general
issue of presidential succession-which suggests that they are also not
considering adequately a Vice President's presidential competence.78
There is no reason to think that voters are focusing on competence
without considering consistency. And if voters are focusing on
neither competency nor continuity, untying the ticket would force
them to do so.
A final policy concern raised by executive ticket splitting is the gen-
eral specter of "divided" government.79 Many lawyers and academics
decry the current pattern of Republican Presidents pointing fingers at
Democratic Congresses-and vice versa-with voters left wondering
whom to credit for good things and whom to blame for bad ones. 80
Once again, however, this concern seems to prove too much. To
begin with, complete acceptance of this critique seems to require
rethinking and possibly even radical amendment of the main struc-
77 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
78 See Witcover, supra note 15, at 7-8 (suggesting that some voters did not pay enough
attention to Quayle's competence to succeed Bush should Bush fail to complete his term).
79 Indeed, concerns about internal and temporal consistency can be seen as particular
aspects of this more general specter.
80 Even Professor Fiorina, who offers various reasons for allowing ticket splitting, expresses
some concern about the diffusion of responsibility and accountability created by divided
government. Fiorina, supra note 1, at 109-11.
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tures of our Constitution-federalism, bicameralism, and separation
of powers. Each of those systems of checks and balances, after all,
tends to diffuse responsibility and can increase the likelihood of dead-
lock. Indeed, Lloyd Cutler and other prominent critics of "divided"
government have proposed various constitutional amendments to
move America towards a parliamentary system that more closely ties
congressional and presidential elections and renders cabinet officials
eligible to serve in Congress."1
But, as these proposals themselves reveal, if divided government is
the problem, perhaps voters should not be allowed to split their tick-
ets between President and Congress or between House and Senate, as
they currently can. The divided-government theory thus fails to
explain the anomaly with which we began: why are voters allowed to
split their tickets in other ways, but not between President and Vice
President? Indeed, the divided-government justification suggests that,
if anything, current ticket-splitting rules are exactly backwards.
Allowing voters to elect legislative and executive officials of different
parties creates real problems of deadlock and diffusion of accountabil-
ity, but these concerns do not loom large in the intra-executive con-
text. Excepting the now rare case of a Senate tie, the Vice President-
unlike Congress-lacks formal power to block a presidential initia-
tive. More importantly, voters know that the President, and not his
Vice, is ultimately responsible for all executive policy. Vice Presi-
dents simply have a voice, not a vote. Put another way, even the par-
liamentary model embraced by critics of divided government provides
room for an opposition party in Congress. Because it lacks the votes
to thwart the ruling government coalition, the opposition party can-
not diffuse responsibility or deadlock policy. It can, however, serve as
a useful watchdog, alerting the public to possible government miscon-
duct and self-dealing. An opposition-party Vice President could serve
a precisely analogous role within the executive.8 2
81 See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time for All Good Men .... 30 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 387, 400-02 (1989) (discussing various proposals); Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government
Under the Constitution, in Reforming American Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the
Committee on the Constitutional System 93, 104-05 (Donald L. Robinson ed. 1985) (same).
82 Of course, if the perceived problems of a divided government were great enough to move
a majority of Americans to support vote tying between Congress and the presidency, it might
not make sense to untie voting within the federal executive branch, because the majority's will
could be undone if a Vice President from the opposition party were to succeed the President




It is, of course, virtually impossible to prove a negative-that is, to
show that no good argument exists in support of the current system of
highly selective vote tying. But nothing in the historical record that
we have uncovered reveals a considered policy judgment by any state
in support of the current anomaly. Although we have not undertaken
an exhaustive state-by-state historical study, our analysis indicates
that the vote-tying policy found in state election codes and ballots
emerged as a direct result of the move in the early nineteenth century
to a system of general elections for federal executive offices. Because
the actual election of the President and Vice President was effected by
electors at the electoral college, it made sense for states to structure
the general elections to allow the general electorate to choose between
electors pledged to particular presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates. And naturally, those persons who wanted to be electors were
those most deeply involved in politics-party politics. As a result, the
electoral college candidates were persons who had strong affiliations
with one of the existing parties. Thus, the current system gradually
evolved, in which the major parties themselves choose the electoral
college candidates, who are then voted for at the general election. As
noted above, ballots often do not include the names of the electoral
college candidates themselves;8" election code provisions in many
states provide that a vote for a party's candidates is a vote for the
electors pledged to that party.84
It should come as no surprise that evolving state electoral systems
during the nineteenth century sought to take advantage of existing
party structures and machinery. Remember, ticket splitting is essen-
tially a phenomenon of the last fifty years.85 In the nineteenth cen-
83 See supra note 51.
84 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 (1952) (stating that "in one form or another, [these
states] allow a vote for the presidential candidate of the [party's] national conventionI to be
counted as a vote for his party's nominees for the electoral college").
85 See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text. One set of reasons that "[t]icket-splitting
was almost unheard of in the nineteenth century," Wilson, supra note 10, at 190, derives from
the ballots then in general use. In the mid-nineteenth century, "unofficial" ballots were the
norm. These ballots were printed by the parties themselves, and each party's ballot listed only
its own candidates. A voter wanting to split his ticket had to engage in a complicated process
of combining different parties' printed ballots, crossing out some printed entries and/or writing
in others. In the late nineteenth century, states shifted to official ballots, printed by the
government, that listed candidates of all parties; but many states structured these ballots by
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tury, it made perfect sense for states to allow parties to put forth
electors pledged to party tickets before the general election. But there
is no reason a state could not restructure its ballot and election provi-
sions so as to select collegians after, rather than before, the general
election-and to select them based on the results of a general election
in which voters are free to vote for a President and Vice President of
opposing parties. Those states that permit write-in votes in the presi-
dential election already implicitly recognize this option: because there
are no known collegians pledged to a write-in ticket at the time of the
general election, a state would be forced to select collegians after the
general election if a write-in ticket were ever to garner a plurality of
the state's popular vote. Because no presidential write-in ticket has
ever won in any state, states have not clearly focused on their options
in this regard.86
In short, the current system of selective vote tying seems more an
inherited product of the nineteenth century's political climate and the
twentieth century's inattention than a deliberate, self-conscious
choice. No one seems to have clearly framed the question, or tried to
answer it, as we have here. Mere inattention, however, is not the
whole story; inertia also looms large in this area. For example, it is
now widely understood that the current electoral system allows a can-
didate to win an outright majority of the popular vote, yet lose in the
electoral college. Indeed, in the 1988 election, which Dukakis lost by
more than 7 million votes, if fewer than 600,000 voters in certain key
states had switched sides, Dukakis would have won in the electoral
simply printing the parties' slates in parallel columns. To vote for every candidate of a single
party, the voter merely had to mark the top of the appropriate column. In contrast to this
"party-column" (or "Indiana") ballot, an "office-bloc" (or "Massachussetts") ballot lists all
candidates by office; a voter cannot vote a straight party line by making a single mark.
Unsurprisingly, states that use office-bloc ballots tend to experience more ticket splitting than
those that do not. See Jerrold D. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split
Ticket Voting: 1876-1908, 64 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1220 (1970).
86 As noted earlier, the constitutionality of state efforts to bind collegians to vote a certain
way after the state's general election has not been definitively resolved, although the logic of
Ray v. Blair strongly suggests that states can bind collegians any way they choose. See supra
note 47. A state is certainly free, however, to pick collegians it thinks will vote a certain way at
the electoral college. Picking collegians put forth by parties (regardless of whether such
parties require prospective collegians to make a pledge) may give the states a comfortable
margin of confidence, because party zealots are not likely to deviate from the party line when
voting in the electoral college. But states surely could devise a means for picking collegians
after the general election, who the states would be confident would abide by the wishes of the
state's electorate, even if the electorate favored a split executive ticket.
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college, even though Bush would have received more than 52 percent
of the vote, compared to Dukakis' 46 percent.8 7 Had this actually
happened in 1988, who doubts that a serious crisis of democratic
legitimacy might have arisen?s8 Who doubts that the Constitution
might well have been swiftly amended in favor of de jure popular elec-
tion, or something close, to prevent the repeat of such a democratic
nightmare? But if all this is so, why, apart from inertia-blind inertia,
stupid inertia-are we sitting around waiting for a constitutional acci-
dent to occur? Perhaps the same phenomenon is at work in the
anomaly we have identified here. If, God forbid, something were to
happen to President Bush, is there any doubt that the American elec-
torate would seriously rethink the current vote-tying rules? And if
not, why are we waiting for disaster to strike?
IV. ADVANTAGES OF ALLOWING TICKET SPLITTING
The previous section attempted to debunk potential justifications
for the prohibition on executive ticket splitting. In that section, we
discovered not only that no obvious justification exists for a prohibi-
tion on ticket splitting, but also that several potential benefits accrue
from a contrary rule. For example, allowing voters to choose their
Vice President in an independent contest forces them to focus on a
potential Vice President's presidential competence. Additionally, a
Vice President from an opposition party, if selected, could serve as a
watchdog for the American people by sniffing out possible executive
misconduct and self-dealing. In this Part, we identify additional
advantages that might be gained by rethinking the current system.89
First, a move away from the current system also moves us away
from the phenomenon of ticket balancing. If ticket splitting were per-
mitted, each party might well tend to choose presidential and vice-
87 See America Votes 1990, at 9 (Richard M. Scammon & Alice V. McGillivray eds. 1991)
(showing that Dukakis could have won California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri,
Maryland, Connecticut, Colorado, New Mexico, and Vermont-and, thus, the presidency-if
600,000 voters cast votes for him rather than for Bush).
88 Ironically, one possible democratic deus ex machina in this scenario-the mass defection
of Dukakis-pledged electoral collegians in favor of Bush-may well have been foreclosed by
the seemingly democratic practice of trying to legally bind electors on the outcome of state
elections. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
89 We do not intend this section to be an exhaustive discussion of all potential benefits of
untying the executive ticket. Our purpose in this section, and throughout this Essay, is to
provoke serious thought and discussion of the possible benefits and drawbacks.
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presidential candidates who represented the same segment of the
party. If (notwithstanding the voters' option to split the ticket) a
party was able to capture both the presidency and the vice-presidency,
the internal and temporal consistency concerns identified earlier
would actually be ameliorated.
Even if a divided executive were elected, significant benefits might
accrue. Most important among these would be a more bipartisan for-
eign policy. Many scholars, most notably Harold Koh, have com-
mented on the shift in foreign-affairs power this century to the hands
of the President.90 One unfortunate consequence of this shift has been
the loss of bipartisanship in the decisionmaking process, with the
party outside the White House being frozen out. A split executive
could lead to a broader-based foreign policy.
An even more important benefit of allowing ticket splitting, and
one that obtains whether voters exercise the option, is the improved
quality of vice-presidential candidates. If parties know that the vice-
presidential candidate must compete directly against the opposing
party's vice-presidential candidate, they will be less likely to put forth
weak candidates for that office. Thus, had voters been free to vote for
Bush and Bentsen together, it is very unlikely that Bush would have
picked a running mate as untested as Quayle. This is not to say that
Bush expected his choice of Quayle to be as controversial as it was; it
is only to say that had voters been able to split their tickets, Bush
never would have run the risk. In short, just as a President need not
actually exercise his veto in order to shape legislation, voters need not
exercise the split-ticket option to affect the quality of the candidates
put forth by the parties.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, allowing voters to elect
executive officials from different parties reflects due respect for voter
sovereignty. If, in a democracy, the voters truly prefer a divided exec-
utive-and we have seen good reasons why they might-why should
the popular will be frustrated?91
90 See Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 117-49 (1990).
91 We have, of course, already anticipated and addressed two possible answers to this




In the end, we have been unable to find any obviously compelling
reason for the prohibition on executive ticket splitting in federal elec-
tions. Each state is free to change its rules-tomorrow, if it so desires;
such a change would not require a constitutional amendment or a
change in federal law. Moreover, if even one state were to do so, the
outcome of presidential and vice-presidential elections could conceiv-
ably be changed. Given the advantages of permitting choice that we
have identified, combined with the strong preference for voter choice
inherent in our constitutional democracy, one or more states may
want to consider experimenting. At the very least, states should come
up with a better reason for the status quo than unthinking inertia.
What would have happened if such an experiment had been tried in
1988? At first blush, it might seem that Lloyd Bentsen would be Vice
President today, for he may well have beaten Quayle in an "untied"
election. But, as we noted above, had ticket-splitting ground rules
been in place in 1988, Quayle might well have never been nominated.
At the very least, the Republican party would have vetted its potential
vice-presidential candidates more carefully, perhaps in the presiden-
tial primary system or even via a separate vice-presidential primary.
From the proper ex ante perspective, it is clear that the real winner in
our hypothetical 1988 contest might not have been the Democrat
Bentsen, but a Republican like Bob Dole or Jack Kemp. Indeed,
Bush himself might have benefited greatly, even if Quayle had contin-
ued to be the vice-presidential nominee. Instead of being obliged to
run a three-legged race with an electoral gimp, Bush would have been
"untied" and might have received even more votes than he did.
As we hope these last points indicate, our explication of the ticket-
splitting issue is not some sly attempt to manipulate sensible electoral
rules in order to get Democrats into the White House through the
back door of the vice-presidency. If a majority of voters prefer a uni-
tary Republican executive, so be it. But even then, shouldn't our elec-
toral rules be designed to put the best Republican Vice President in
the White House?
Perhaps Dan Quayle is the best. Perhaps the American public has
been unfair to him. Historically, Vice Presidents have been the butt
of many unfair jokes. Yet, once again, this sad fact is a predictable
consequence of the current electoral system. The Vice President has
virtually no constitutional duties by which he can distinguish himself
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once in office, and to make matters worse, he lacks any personal elec-
toral mandate from the American people. The generic Vice President
is inherently an awkward and slightly ridiculous figure, whose main
asset is a beating heart and whose main job is sitting around the White
House, unobtrusively waiting for the President to die. Of course, this
role as next-in-line is an awesome one, worthy of great respect, but it
is a role obscured by current ticket-splitting prohibitions. Instead of
focusing on this key role, and this alone, by unbundling the executive
ticket, current voting rules encourage voters to view the vice-presiden-
tial candidate as yet another plank in the presidential candidate's plat-
form. Instead of giving him an independent electoral mandate,92
current voting rules treat the Vice President more like a cabinet
department head-which he is not-than the next President of the
United States-which he may be.
If Dan Quayle had to run on his own this year and nonetheless won,
maybe the jokes would stop.
92 At least one commentator has suggested a constitutional amendment to encourage the
selection of better Vice Presidents. Witcover proposes that a general election be held only for
the presidency, with the winner then submitting his or her vice-presidential choice to Congress
for confirmation. See Witcover, supra note 15, at 415-17. Yet, under Witcover's scheme, the
Vice President would still lack an independent electoral legitimacy-a factor Witcover
acknowledges as contributing to the lack of respect and effectiveness that plague many who
hold the office. See id. at 416. Elsewhere, Witcover fleetingly touches upon allowing ticket
splitting and concludes, without devoting any real attention or analysis to the possibilities, that
it would be "too perilous to accept." See id. at 408.
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